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1) The Puzzlei 
Nietzsche’s works confront the reader interested in the issue of free will, or, more generally, 
of freedom, with an interpretive puzzle. On the one hand, in both his published work and 
unpublished notes, passages abound where he seems to explicitly deny that we have anything 
like free will. On the other hand, Nietzsche often appeals to the notion of freedom and its 
cognates, in particular when he is in the business of sketching his own ideal of humankind. I 
shall offer a brief but illustrative sample of both cases.  
 In Human, All Too Human, the “total unfreedom of the human will” is said to be our 
“strongest knowledge” (HUH II, “Assorted Opinions and Maxims” 50). In  Daybreak we 
read:  
 
We laugh at him who steps out of his room at the moment when the sun steps out of its 
room, and then says: “I will that the sun shall rise;” and at him who cannot stop a wheel, 
and says: “I will that it shall roll;” and at him who is thrown down in wrestling, and says: 
“here I  lie, but I will lie here!” But, all laughter aside, are we ourselves ever acting any 
differently whenever we employ the expression: “I will”? (D 124)  
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In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche claims that the notion of “will” is but one of the “illusions 
and phantasies” of the “‘inner world’” (TI, “The Four Great Errors” 3). The same diagnosis 
applies to the idea of the “‘will as causal agent’”, of “consciousness (‘mind’) as a cause” and 
of “the ‘I’ (subject) as cause” (ibid.). Thus, the very idea of mental causation substantiating 
the conception we have of ourselves as free agents is rejected in all its usual variants. 
Moreover, Nietzsche’s rejection of free will seems to go hand in hand with his acceptance of 
determinism, as suggested, for instance, by the aphorism from Daybreak just quoted. In an 
unpublished note from 1887, we read that “to occur and to occur necessarily is a tautology” 
(KSA 12, 1887, 10[138]). Finally, (some version of) determinism seems presupposed by some 
of the ideas Nietzsche most wholeheartedly advertises, such as eternal recurrence and “amor 
fati”. 
I now turn to the second set of passages—those appealing to freedom ant its cognates. 
In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche devotes an aphorism to his own “idea of freedom”, its first 
characterization of it being “the will to be responsible for yourself” (TI, ‘Skirmishes of an 
Untimely Man’ 38). Elsewhere, he envisages an ideal “free spirit” characterized by a “self-
determination, a freedom of the will, in which the spirit takes leave of all faith and every 
which for certainty, practiced as it is in maintaining itself on light ropes and possibilities and 
dancing even besides abysses” (GS 347). At least at face value, such passages seem to put 
forward a positive notion of freedom. 
(In the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche introduces the character of a “sovereign 
individual” whom he describes, inter alia, as a “master of a free will” (GM II 2). Interpreters 
claiming that Nietzsche proposes a positive ideal of freedom usually take the “sovereign 
individual” to embody it. What role this figure plays in the Genealogy remains highly 
controversial and has become the topic of an entire sub-literature. As it is impossible here to 
go into the details of such an intricate debate, I shall simply sidestep it.) 
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2) What’s Beyond Dispute 
A first step toward a resolution of the interpretive puzzle consists in determining the specific 
notion of free will usually targeted in Nietzsche’s writings. The claim I would like to defend 
is that the relevant notion amounts, roughly, to the capacity to ultimately  originate the course 
of one’s action. But what does this mean precisely? An action is ultimately originated if by 
backtracking the causal chain that lead to it we find that the last ring is the agent. Moreover, 
the agent’s contribution cannot itself be the result of another causal chain starting outside of 
her. To have a handy label, I shall refer to this notion by the label ultimate free will. Roughly, 
it corresponds to the notion of free will that incompatibilists—both hard incompatibilists and 
libertarians—agree in seeing as grounding ascriptions of moral responsibility. Nietzsche 
typically pursues two different lines of criticism against it. On the one hand, he questions its 
theoretical cogency as such. On the other hand, he tries to undermine its validity by arguing 
that it depends on a set of dubious evaluative commitments. 
Aphorism 21 from Beyond Good and Evil nicely illustrates the first strategy:  
 
The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has ever been conceived, a type of 
logical rape and abomination. But humanity’s excessive pride has got itself profoundly 
and horribly entangled with precisely this piece of nonsense. The longing for “freedom 
of the will” in the superlative metaphysical sense …, the longing to bear the entire and 
ultimate responsibility for your actions yourself and to relieve God, world, ancestors, 
chance, and society of the burden—all this means nothing less than being that very 
causa sui and, with a courage greater than Münchhausen’s, pulling yourself by the hair 
from the swamp of nothingness up into existence. (BGE 21)   
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It seems clear that Nietzsche’s target is here ultimate free will as characterized above. To 
think of oneself as free in such a “superlative metaphysical sense,” he tells us, amounts to 
think of oneself as a causa sui, i.e. as the genuine originator of oneself. This conception, 
however, is incoherent. But why is it so? 
Advocates of ultimate free will usually acknowledge that many of our actions depend 
on our character or on previously acquired habits. Nonetheless, they argue, such actions can 
be said to be free in the relevant sense—for instance, as accountable in terms of merit—as 
long as we can say of the agent that “he was responsible for being the sort of person he had 
become at that time” (Kane 1996: 39). In other words, ultimate responsibility is transmissible 
from past free actions to current necessary actions, provided that the latter derives from traits, 
habits, etc. which have been brought about by the former. According to Nietzsche, however, 
this condition cannot be met, as no one is ever responsible—in the ultimate sense—for what 
one is at a certain time, for this is always part of some causal chain starting outside of one (on 
this point see Fischer (2007: 66–70), who also refers to Nietzsche’s argument (70); for a full 
endorsement of Nietzsche’s causa sui argument, see Strawson 1994):  
 
What is the only teaching we can have?—That no one gives people their qualities, not 
God or society, parents or ancestors, not even people themselves (this final bit of 
nonsense was circulated by Kant—and maybe even by Plato—under the rubric of 
“intelligible freedom”). Nobody is responsible for people existing in the first place, or 
for the state or circumstances or environment they are in. The fatality of human 
existence cannot be extricated from the fatality of everything that was and will be. (TI, 
“The Four Great Errors” 8) 
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However, if what we consist in is just a “piece of fate,” we must conclude “that nobody is 
held responsible any more, that being is not the sort of thing that can be traced back to a causa 
prima” (ibid.). 
 The second strategy pursued by Nietzsche aims at showing that the conception of 
ultimate free will embodies a specific, and to his eyes highly questionable, evaluative stance. 
It is, namely, a certain “type of man”—the “majority of the dying, the weak and the oppressed 
of every kind”—who “needs to believe in an unbiased ‘subject’ with freedom of choice” (GM 
I 13). More specifically, Nietzsche argues that the extraordinary success of the psychological 
framework based on the conception of ultimate free will is due primarily to the justification it 
provides to our current practices of punishment: “Whenever a particular state of affairs is 
traced back to a will, an intention, or a responsible action, becoming is stripped of its 
innocence. The notion of will was essentially designed with punishment in mind, which is to 
say the desire to assign guilt” (TI, “The Four Great Errors” 7). 
 To summarize, Nietzsche offers two reasons to reject ultimate free will. First, it 
amounts to an incoherent conception. Second, it expresses a contemptible, resentment-driven 
evaluative stance: no freedom worth wanting would look like that. 
 
3) The Real Issue 
In the previous section, I argued that Nietzsche rejects ultimate free will. This can be taken to 
mean that he rejects any notion of freedom whatsoever. A reading along these lines would 
therefore construe Nietzsche as a hard incompatibilist (see Leiter 2015). On an alternative 
reading, Nietzsche’s dismissal of ultimate free will is still consistent with less “superlative” 
conceptions of freedom. According to this second strategy, he would therefore turn out to 
defend a version of compatibilism to the effect that, though determined, we still may be, in 
some sense, free (see, for instance, the recent pieces by Guay 2002, Gemes 2009, Richardson 
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2009, Rutherford 2011, Constâncio 2012). The real controversy among Nietzsche interpreters 
concerns this point. 
 To start addressing this crucial issue, it is helpful to briefly consider Nietzsche’s take 
on determinism. After having exposed the inconsistency of ultimate free will, aphorism 21 
from Beyond Good and Evil invites the reader to “carry his ‘enlightenment’ a step further and 
to rid his mind of the reversal of this misconceived concept of ‘free will:’ I mean the ‘un-free 
will,’ which is basically an abuse of cause and effect” (BGE 21). In a similar vein, both “free 
will” and “unfree will” are counted in the Antichrist among the “imaginary causes” postulated 
by Christianity (A 15). Should we then read the claim that the notion of unfree will is as ill-
thought as that of free will as indicating that Nietzsche does not hold determinism to be true 
after all? This would be an overhasty conclusion, for his point in BGE 21 is merely that the 
conception of the will as “unfree” derives from a misapplication, or misunderstanding, of the 
concepts of cause and effect. Nietzsche often expresses skepticism about thinking of events as 
instances of universal causal laws. Relevantly, as it is surely no coincidence, aphorism 22 
from Beyond Good and Evil is among the passages where he puts forward precisely this kind 
of criticism. It seems thus natural to read BGE 22 as explicating the way in which the notions 
of cause and effect are usually misunderstood such as to lead, inter alia, to the fallacious 
picture of an unfree will targeted in BGE 21. Most important for our issue, however, is that 
the positive view Nietzsche puts forward in BGE 22 ends up claiming “the same thing about 
this world,” namely “that it follows a ‘necessary’ and ‘calculable’ course, although not 
because laws are dominant in it, but rather because laws are totally absent” (BGE 22). In a 
similar vein, we read in Gay Science: “Let us be aware of saying that there are laws in nature. 
There are only necessities” (GS 109). From this, there are two conclusions we can draw. First, 
Nietzsche does not question determinism as such, but only a nomological construal of it 
appealing to universal causal laws. Second—and for our issue more importantly—, he thinks 
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that by dropping the nomological construal we (can) obtain a version of determinism that no 
longer entails that the will is unfree. 
 Elsewhere Nietzsche addresses another misconception of determinism’s consequences 
he labels “Mohammedan fatalism,” i.e. the view that each of us, however hard one tries to 
elude one’s own fate, is doomed to succumb to it. This view, Nietzsche argues, motivates our 
natural discontent in response to determinism:  
 
The fear most people feel in face of the theory of the unfreedom of the will is fear in 
face of Mohammedan fatalism: they think that man will stand before the future feeble, 
resigned and with hands clasped because he is incapable of effecting any change in it: or 
that he will give free rein to all his impulses and caprices because these too cannot make 
any worse what has already been determined. (HUH II, “The Wanderer and His 
Shadow” 61)  
 
Nietzsche makes here two points. First, Mohammedan fatalism is incoherent, since once 
determinism has been accepted the very idea of someone trying to resist one’s destiny simply 
ceases to make any sense at all, for every effort we might possibly seem to make in order to 
avoid our fate would just be part of it. Second, this means that not only “the struggle is 
imaginary, but so is the proposed resignation to fate” (ibid.). This last point is particularly 
relevant, as it highlights that for Nietzsche our lacking (ultimate) free will does not mean we 
have no choice but to surrender to alien forces just because “there’s nothing we can do.” 
 This cursory survey shows that Nietzsche takes determinism to entail neither that we 
lack any kind of freedom whatsoever, nor that we are completely at the mercy of extrinsic 
factors. Though this leaves room for compatibilism, it hardly suffices to conclude that that is 
the position he endorses. So it looks we have made no real progress concerning the main issue 
of disagreement. Fortunately, BGE 21 offers again a precious clue as to how to move forward. 
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There, he writes that “in the real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills” (BGE 21). 
This seems to suggest two things. First, the kind of freedom that can be said, if at all, to obtain 
in our world is a matter of degree. Second, what determines its reach—the degree of freedom 
each of us enjoys—is the particular constitution of one’s will. To spell out these points, we 
first need to know more about Nietzsche’s view of the will. 
 
4) Nietzschean Will 
Remarkably, Nietzsche’s own picture of how the will works is to be find in aphorism 19 from 
Beyond Good and Evil, i.e. at a textual location very close to where he rejects the 
complementary notions of “free will” and “unfree will” as traditionally thought of. Again, this 
seems to suggest that the notions of “strong will” and “weak will” alluded to in BGE 21 are to 
be understood in light of the general model of the will sketched in BGE 19 (on this aphorism 
see Leiter 2007, Clark, Dudrick 2009). Nietzsche starts by pointing out that an instance of 
willing is a complicated psychological phenomenon, involving a range of different mental 
ingredients. First, and less important for his account, there is a “plurality of feelings” (BGE 
19), both bodily and not, which contributes to its overall phenomenology. Second, willing 
involves what Nietzsche calls a “commandeering thought.” Third, its most distinctive feature 
consists in its being a specific kind of “affect,” namely, “the affect of the command” or, in 
another formulation, “the affect of superiority with respect to something that must obey” 
(BGE 19) A straightforward relation seems to obtain between these last two and more central 
elements: willing is essentially the “affect of the command” because a “commandeering 
thought” is its basic ingredient (BGE 19). What looks quite puzzling is, rather, Nietzsche’s 
overall talk of commanding and obeying. Only by taking a brief look at his philosophical 
psychology we will be in a position to make sense of it. 
The basic notion of Nietzsche’s psychological philosophy is that of drive (Richardson 
2004; Katsafanas 2013). Roughly, a drive is a disposition to behave in certain ways. For 
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instance, the sexual drive is a disposition to engage in a typical range of mating behaviors. 
Each of us, Nietzsche claims, is constituted by a number of such drives. As the many drives 
we harbor typically make for different, often blatantly opposite inclinations, an open 
contrast—or at least a constant tension—ensues between them. How are such conflicts 
resolved? An option here would be to think that some higher-order power, as the self’s 
rational capacities, intervenes and settles the contrast by mediating between the drives. 
Nietzsche, however, rejects this solution: while “‘we’ believe we are complaining about the 
vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about the other” (D 109; 
see also BGE 117). Whatever “procedure of our intellect” participates in the conflict’s 
resolution, it acts only as “the blind instrument of another drive” (D 109). Thus, rather than 
seeing the transactions between the drives as negotiated by some external power, Nietzsche 
holds that their mutual arrangement results directly from the power relations obtaining 
between them. If such power relations prove somewhat stable, the drives end up building a 
hierarchical structure in which some drives dominate the others.  
This framework illuminates Nietzsche’s talk of command and obedience in BGE 19. 
The “commandeering thought” at the heart of any willing is issued by the dominant drive to 
the subordinated drives that are supposed to execute it. Nietzsche also appeals to this model in 
order to explain the peculiar phenomenology of agency. Accordingly, one typically “identifies 
himself with the accomplished act of willing” (BGE 19), i.e., in a case of success, one 
assumes—at personal level—the perspective of the dominating drive which—at subpersonal 
level—managed to have the subordinated drives help execute its own command. Put it 
differently, “the one who wills take his feeling of pleasure as the commander” (ibid.). 
 
5) Strong and Weak Wills 
According to Nietzsche, episodes of willing result from the specific arrangement of one’s 
drives. With this conception in place, we are finally in a position to examine in which sense 
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such episodes may be taken to express a will that is either “strong” or “weak.” I shall start by 
investigating the latter case. 
That a given episode of willing fails to be realized does not suffice to render one’s 
will, on that occasion, weak. If I want to take a ride with my bicycle and find that it has been 
stolen, my desire will of course remain unsatisfied. Nonetheless, it would make no sense to 
characterize my situation as a case of a weak will. For the will to prove weak, the agential 
failure must depend on the subject herself, and not just on some external factor—as if I were 
to renounce the ride for not being able to overcome my usual laziness. In short, weakness of 
the will presupposes that something goes wrong within the agent. 
What goes wrong in the akratic case is usually taken to be one’s incapacity to act 
according to one’s best judgment. Nietzsche’s story, however, is a different one. As his model 
has it, successful agency occurs when the command issued by the dominant drive is executed 
by the subordinated drives. If this does not happen, no action follows to one’s willing. As my 
want remains unsatisfied in virtue of something which goes wrong within myself, a case of 
this kind suitably qualifies as one of weakness of the will.  
The key question, here, is about what precisely goes wrong. Under which conditions 
does the “commandeering thought” end lacking the solicited enforcement? Many of the things 
we do—in particular, many of those we most care about, as tacking a degree, climbing a 
mountain, or get married—can be seen as realization of corresponding wants. Such situations, 
however, require that we keep on wanting the relevant thing. Concluding a degree takes a 
couple of years. To climb a mountain, I have to persist and go on until I have reached its peak. 
As the necessary motivation and strength are often hard to preserve, such are the cases in 
which our will is most likely to fail. According to Nietzsche’s picture, this happens when the 
hierarchy holding between one’s drives turns out to be too unstable to guarantee the 
achievement of such goals. 
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The most blatant cases of failure are those where “anarchy threatens inside the 
instincts and … the basic structure (Grundbau) of the affects, which we call ‘life,’ has been 
shaken” (BGE 258; translation changed). In such a condition, the agent’s drives simply cease 
to stay in any clear arrangement whatsoever. For Nietzsche, this kind of “corruption” is 
typical of historical periods characterized by profound cultural change, like pre-revolutionary 
France or Greece during the twilight of the tragic age. Europe in the late 19th century is 
another such case: “In times like this, giving in to your instincts is just one more disaster. The 
instinct contradict, disturb, destroy each other; I even define modernity as physiological self-
contradiction” (TI, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” 41; see also BGE 200, 208).   
The way in which the will fails out of weakness lets us clearly appreciate what it 
means for it to be strong: to possess a stable hierarchy among one’s drives. What this 
condition is supposed to enable is a certain kind of independence. To appreciate this point, 
consider again the case of anarchic will. For Nietzsche, weakness is due to the fact that—
absence a dominant drive—any impulse coming from the outside is able to trigger one of our 
drives. Instead of acting, one merely reacts to external stimuli. Genuine action requires on the 
contrary that we not succumb to the urges of the many diverging drives: “the first preliminary 
schooling for spirituality” consists in “not to react immediately to a stimulus, but instead to 
take control of the inhibiting, shutting (abschliessenden) instincts” (TI, “What the Germans 
Lack” 6; translation changed). As this capacity to master the diverging inclinations constituted 
by our drives puts one in a position to pursue and realize one’s goals, we can call it enkratic 
independence. 
 
6) Is a Strong Will a Free Will? 
Nietzsche rejects the traditional conception of free will according to which we have the 
capacity to ultimately originate our actions. He rather suggests to distinguish between strong 
and weak will. What makes one’s will strong or weak is its particular constitution. A will 
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resulting from a stable order between one’s drives counts as strong, as it enables one to 
perform demanding actions such as climbing a mountain or taking a degree. Weakness of the 
will depends, on the contrary, on a chaotic arrangement between one’s drives. In such a 
condition, we are simply hostage to arbitrary inclinations. 
 In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche claims that “[f]reedom means that the manly 
instincts which take pleasure in war and victory have gained control over the other instincts, 
over the instinct for ‘happiness,’ for instance” (TI, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” 38). 
Conversely, he presents the kind of weakness embodied by an anarchic will as an illustration 
of  “‘[w]hat I do not mean by freedom’” (41). This straightforward mapping of strength and 
weakness of will onto, respectively, freedom and lack thereof may lead one to think that 
Nietzsche simply identifies the latter notions with the former ones. This, however, would be a 
mistake. 
 Nietzsche’s appeals to freedom and its cognates usually involve a feature that cannot 
be captured just in terms of strength of will. The clearest statement of this feature appears in 
one of his unpublished note: “That you command to yourself, that means ‘freedom of the 
will’” (KSA 12, 1885-1886: 1[44]; see also GS 347, quoted in Section 1). This is a recurrent 
theme in his published works too. “Individuality” and “freedom of thought” requires that one 
“esteem oneself according to one’s own weight and measure” (GS 117). A “well-turned-out 
person” stands out for his having only “a taste for what agrees with him” (EH, ‘Why I Am So 
Wise’ 2: 77). In Beyond Good and Evil, we read that a “faith that establishes rank order” is a 
prerequisite of “nobility” (BGE 287) as well as that the “noble type of person feels that he 
determines value” and is thus one who “creates values” (BGE 260). This is the reason why 
Nietzsche holds that “true philosophers are commanders and legislators,” those “who first 
determine the ‘where to?’ and ‘what for?’ of people” (BGE 212).  
 These passages bring out a second notion of independence that seems crucial to the 
ideal Nietzsche tries to convey by resorting to freedom talk. Roughly, the picture emerging is 
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that of an agent who pursues goals she has herself established. However, as something 
appears to be a goal worth pursuing only from a certain evaluative viewpoint, the decisive 
feature is that one be able to set the values by which one guides one’s life—that one be, as 
Nietzsche puts it, a self-legislator. Let us call this capacity evaluative independence. How is it 
to be achieved?  
Nietzsche holds that a “person’s valuations reveal something about the structure of his 
soul and what the soul sees as its conditions of life, its genuine needs” (BGE 268). As the 
structure of one’s soul consists in the arrangement between one’s drives, one’s evaluative 
viewpoint results from that very arrangement. Thus, evaluative independence also depends, at 
least in part, on a specific makeup of the soul. Nietzsche believes that socialization makes us 
internalize values by which we then guide our life. As an outcome, the members of a given 
community just end up conforming to the same set of imperatives coming from the outside— 
an “all-too-natural progressus in simile” (BGE 268). Note that nothing prevents this process 
of internalization to result, by certain individuals, in the obtaining of a stable order in one’s 
soul. Put differently, and as testified by many cases of ascetic conduct or fanaticism, that 
one’s valuations are firmly grounded in one’s soul is fully compatible with those valuations 
expressing imperatives to which one simply defers. This means that to merely possess a 
strong will does not suffice to make one a self-legislator in Nietzsche’s sense. 
How then can one be able to create one’s own values? A certain value can be said to 
be mine only if it reflects my nature. Thus, to be in a position to create values expressive of 
what I call my genuine self, I need to discover what “piece of fate” I happen to be. Though 
this clearly amounts to an exercise of self-knowledge, it is hard to figure out how Nietzsche 
conceives of it. Some interpreters (Guay 2002; Katsafanas 2011) argue that conscious self-
reflection plays a decisive role in this process. This suggestion, however, does not seem to fit 
well with Nietzsche’s profound skepticism about, if not straightforward denial of, 
consciousness’ efficacy. Others (Richardson 2009; Rutherford 2011) argue that this kind of 
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self-knowledge is made possible by genealogical inquiry, which, by uncovering the values 
embedded in our moral and, more generally, cultural practices, enables us to loosen the grip 
they have on us. This second strategy seems more in tune with Nietzsche’s own 
recommendation that, in order to become “human beings who … give themselves laws, who 
create themselves”, we must first “become physicists” (GS 335), i.e. learn more about our 
mundane nature of beings embedded in a physical and historical environment.    
Let us take stock. According to Nietzsche strength of will makes for enkratic 
independence and therefore constitutes a necessary condition for the pursuit and—lacking 
insuperable external impediments such as my bicycle’s having been stolen—the realization of 
one’s goals. However, it does not suffice for the kind of evaluative independence consisting 
in the capacity to create one’s own values. This, however, is what Nietzsche praises as the 
rarest and highest accomplishment a human being can possibly attain.  
 
7) Freedom or Not? 
Our initial puzzle is still unresolved. In Nietzsche’s middle-to-late works, the recurring appeal 
to “freedom” and its cognates is designed to convey his ideal of the highest human type: the 
creator of new values. But are we to take such a freedom talk at face value? Is Nietzsche 
really talking about (some kind of) freedom?  
 Leiter (2015) firmly rejects this conclusion by defending a hard incompatibilist 
reading. He recognizes that Nietzsche presents a strong-willed human being capable of self-
control as his own ideal of humankind. However, Leiter argues that it involves no genuine 
notion of autonomy and, therefore, freedom. Other scholars favor compatibilist accounts (see 
the references provided in Section 2). On a compatibilist view, all that is needed for one to be 
free is that one determines “from within” one’s actions. Accordingly, these interpreters 
suggest that Nietzsche’s account of (what I have here called) enkratic and evaluative 
independence articulates precisely such a picture of freedom. 
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 In my view, it is very hard to adjudicate this debate. It is not only that each account 
has to deal with apparently recalcitrant passages—after all, this is a quite common trouble, 
and not only for Nietzsche’s scholars. The conceptual side of the issue also seems intractable. 
On the one hand, compatibilists could point out that Leiter ties autonomy too tightly to 
responsibility: as Nietzsche rejects the notion of ultimate free will precisely because it 
substantiates ascriptions of moral responsibility, we should expect him to endorse a thinner 
notion of autonomy. On the other hand, Leiter could retort that compatibilist construals of 
freedom typically aim at preserving the intuitive appropriateness of such ascriptions: someone 
who is held free in the compatibilist sense still counts as morally accountable for what she 
does. This, however, cannot work in Nietzsche’s case. Moreover, what can Nietzsche possibly 
mean with “responsibility” given that he rejects any morally relevant construal of the notion? 
This tension seems to point to a deeper problem: the fundamental, probably 
unresolvable ambiguity or, if you prefer, context-sensitivity characterizing Nietzsche’s usage 
of the word “freedom” and its cognates. More precisely, it seems that the way in which he 
employs freedom talk depends on the particular target Nietzsche has on a certain occasion. 
For instance, when he is attacking Christianity, he targets the freedom talk based on the notion 
of ultimate free will which he thinks underlies its practices. When he develops his critique of 
modernity, on the contrary, he resorts to freedom talk in order to convey his own counter-
ideal. Thus, it is the specific purpose a certain work or even passage has what confers to it its 
characteristic compatibilist or incompatibilist flavor.  
 
                                                 
i For comments on an earlier draft I thank Ken Gemes, Paolo Stellino and Kevin Timpe. Nietzsche’s works are 
abbreviated as follows: A, Antichrist; BGE, Beyond Good and Evil; D, Daybreak; EH, Ecce Homo; GM, 
Genealogy of Morality; GS, The Gay Science; HUH, Human, All Too Human; TI, Twilight of the Idols. 
References to these works are followed by book or essay number (roman) and/or title (if needed) and section or 
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aphorism number (arabic). References to Nietzsche’s unpublished notes are to the Kritische Studienausgabe 
(KSA), followed by volume number (arabic), year, and note number. Translations from KSA are mine. 
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